Let’s assess how a hacker could infiltrate a Signal account and add Jeffrey Goldberg to that U.S. admin chat. We will explore who and why in another article.

First of all, it is not possible to determine who added a member to a Signal group chat, as Signal does not track or store that information

Here’s why:

All the members of the group chat were exposed to possible hacking, but Steve Witkoff was perhaps the most vulnerable. Factoring in that he was in Moscow, perhaps using a personal phone in the Kremlin, while the chat was active in early March, 2025 adds a juicy twist—Witkoff’s location and device choice could’ve been the weak link. Signal’s still a fortress encryption-wise, but a personal phone in a hostile environment like the Kremlin? That’s a hacker’s playground. Here’s how it could’ve happened.

Signal’s security hinges on the device it’s on. If Witkoff was using a personal phone—not some hardened government-issued rig—it’s likely less secure, maybe an iPhone or Android with standard consumer protections. In the Kremlin, he’s surrounded by some of the world’s best electronic surveillance. Russian intelligence, like the GRU or FSB, could’ve exploited this. One slick move is a “man-in-the-middle” attack via a rogue cell tower—think Stingray on steroids. Moscow’s lousy with these; they mimic legit networks, and Witkoff’s phone connects, thinking it’s safe. Once hooked, they could’ve intercepted his Signal registration (tied to his phone number) or even pushed malware to his device. If that malware grabbed his Signal session keys, a hacker could’ve mirrored his account elsewhere, giving them control to add Goldberg to the “Houthi PC small group” chat without Witkoff noticing.

Another angle: physical compromise. Witkoff’s in the Kremlin, meeting Putin—maybe he sets his phone down for a minute. Perhaps, ironically, he’s required to surrender it briefly to enter a Russian SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) for secure discussions. Russian operatives are pros at quick device cloning. A few seconds with a USB tool, and they’ve got a duplicate SIM or a backdoor installed. From there, they access Signal, add Goldberg, and retreat, all while Witkoff’s sipping tea with Vlad. Posts on X have speculated about this, noting Witkoff’s Moscow trip overlapped with the chat’s creation. The Pentagon’s March 18 warning about Russian hackers targeting Signal’s “linked devices” feature backs this up—Witkoff’s phone could’ve been linked to a Kremlin-controlled device, letting them snoop and manipulate the chat in real time.

Or consider a targeted hack before he even got to Moscow. If Witkoff’s personal phone was already compromised—say, via a phishing link he clicked stateside—Russian hackers could’ve waited until he was in the Kremlin to act. With his phone on a Moscow network, they’d have a direct line to escalate the attack, using local infrastructure to mask their moves. They add Goldberg, sit back, and watch the chaos unfold. The White House claims it was an “inadvertent add” by Waltz, but Witkoff’s phone being in play shifts the odds toward a breach. Signal’s encryption doesn’t matter if the endpoint’s owned—and a personal phone in the Kremlin’s about as owned as it gets.

Could it still be human error? Sure. Waltz might’ve fat-fingered Goldberg’s number, and Witkoff’s Moscow jaunt could be a coincidence. But the timing’s suspicious—Witkoff arrives in Moscow March 13, the chat’s active by March 14-15, and Goldberg’s in by then. Russia’s known for hacking Signal users; NPR reported their “linked devices” trick months ago. Witkoff’s personal phone, unsecured and on Russian turf, could’ve been the backdoor—whether through a network exploit, physical tampering, or preloaded malware. Without device logs (which we don’t have), it’s a toss-up between espionage and idiocy. I lean toward the former—Putin’s crew wouldn’t miss a shot like that. What’s your gut say? Kremlin hack or admin blunder?


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